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Abstract—The problem of private publication of graph data
has attracted a lot of attention recently. The prevalence of
differential privacy makes the problem more promising. However,
a large body of existing works on differentially private release of
graphs have not answered the question about the upper bounds
of privacy budgets. In this paper, for the first time, such a bound
is provided. We prove that with a privacy budget of O(log n),
there exists an algorithm capable of releasing a noisy output
graph with edge edit distance of O(1) against the true graph.
At the same time, the complexity of our algorithm Top-m Filter
is linear in the number of edges m. This lifts the limits of the
state-of-the-art, which incur a complexity of O(n2) where n is
the number of nodes and runnable only on graphs having n of
tens of thousands.
I. INTRODUCTION
As one of the most general forms of data representation,
graphs support all aspects of the relational data mining pro-
cess. With the emergence of increasingly complex networks
[10], the research community requires large and reliable graph
data to conduct in-depth studies. However, this requirement
usually conflicts with privacy policies of data contributing
entities. Naive approaches like removing user ids from a social
graph are not effective, leaving users open to privacy risks,
especially re-identification attacks [1] [7].
In this paper, we address the problem of graph anonymiza-
tion from the perspective of differential privacy. This privacy
model offers a formal definition of privacy with a lot of
interesting properties: no computational/informational assump-
tions about attackers, data type-agnosticity, composability and
so on [9]. By differential privacy, we want to ensure the
existence of connections between users to be hidden in the
released graph while retaining important structural information
for graph analysis [11], [12], [13], [3], [14].
Differentially private algorithms relate the amount of noise
to the sensitivity of computation. Lower sensitivity implies
smaller added noise. Because edges in simple undirected
graphs are usually assumed independent, standard Laplace
mechanism is applicable (e.g. adding Laplace noise to each
cell of the adjacency matrix). However, this approach may
severely deteriorate graph structure. Recent methods of graph
release under differential privacy try to reduce the graph
sensitivity by many ways. Schemes in [11], [12] use dK-
series[8] to summarize the graph into a distribution of de-
gree correlations. The global sensitivity of 1K-series (resp.
2K-series) is 4 (resp. O(n)). Lower sensitivity of O(√n)
is proposed in [13] by graph spectral analysis. The most
recent works [3], [14] even reduce the sensitivity of graph
to O(log n). While Density Explore Reconstruct (DER)[3]
employs a data-dependent quadtree to summarize the adja-
cency matrix into a counting tree, Xiao et al. [14] propose
to use Hierarchical Random Graph (HRG) [4] to encode
graph structural information in terms of edge probabilities.
A common disadvantage of the state-of-the-art DER [3] and
HRG-MCMC [14] is the scalability issue. Both of them incur
quadratic complexity O(n2), limiting themselves to medium-
sized graphs.
To remedy the scalability problem, we propose Top-m Filter
(TmF) algorithm, which runs in O(m), linear in the number
of edges. By considering the adjacency matrix as a sparse
dataset, TmF leverages the high-pass filtering technique in [5]
to avoid the whole matrix manipulation. More importantly, via
TmF, we provide a theoretical result stating that O(log n) is an
upper bound for graph release under differential privacy. This
naturally rules out high-sensitivity schemes in [11], [12], [13]
and makes DER, HRG-MCMC meaningful only in regimes of
small privacy budgets (i.e. not exceeding O(log n)).
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review key concepts and mechanisms of
differential privacy.
A. Differential Privacy
Essentially, ǫ-differential privacy (ǫ-DP) [6] is proposed
to quantify the notion of indistinguishability of neighbor-
ing databases. In the context of graph release, two graphs
G1 = (V1, E1) and G2 = (V2, E2) are neighbors if V1 = V2,
E1 ⊂ E2 and |E2| = |E1|+ 1. Formal definition of ǫ-DP for
graph data is as follows.
Definition 2.1: A mechanism A is ǫ-differentially private if
for any two neighboring graphs G1 and G2, and for any output
O ∈ Range(A),
Pr[A(G1) ∈ O] ≤ eǫPr[A(G2) ∈ O]
Laplace mechanism [6] and Exponential mechanism [9] are
two standard techniques in differential privacy. The latter is
a generalization of the former. Laplace mechanism is based
on the concept of global sensitivity of a function f which
is defined as ∆f = maxG1,G2 ||f(G1) − f(G2)||1 where the
maximum is taken over all pairs of neighboring G1, G2. Given
a function f and a privacy budget ǫ, the noise is drawn from
a Laplace distribution p(x|λ) = 12λe−|x|/λ where λ = ∆f/ǫ.
Theorem 2.1: (Laplace mechanism [6]) For any function f :
G→ Rd, the mechanism A
A(G) = f(G) + 〈Lap1(∆f
ǫ
), ..., Lapd(
∆f
ǫ
)〉 (1)
satisfies ǫ-differential privacy, where Lapi(∆fǫ ) are i.i.d
Laplace variables with scale parameter ∆fǫ . 
Composability is a nice property of differential privacy
which is not satisfied by other privacy models such as k-
anonymity. Specifically, serial and parallel compositions are
key ingredients in our algorithm TmF (Section III).
Theorem 2.2: (Sequential and parallel compositions [9])
Let each Ai provide ǫi-differential privacy. A sequence of
Ai(D) over the dataset D provides Σni=1ǫi-differential privacy.
Let each Ai provide ǫi-differential privacy. Let Di be
arbitrary disjoint subsets of the input domain D. The sequence
of Ai(Di) provides maxni=1 ǫi-differential privacy. 
III. TOP-M FILTER
We introduce our linear time algorithm Top-m Filter (TmF)
in this section by considering the adjacency matrix as a sparse
contingency table. TmF uses an idea similar to High-pass
Filter in [5] to avoid the materialization of the noisy adjacency
matrix. Our algorithm is therefore linear in the number of
edges. By devising TmF, we also reach an upper bound on
privacy budget for graph publication in ǫ-DP setting.
A. Overview
Given the input graph G (represented by an adjacency
matrix A) and privacy budget ǫ, by the assumption of edge in-
dependence, the naive approach (Naive) adds Laplace noise to
all cells in the upper-triangle of A, i.e. A˜ij = Aij +Lap(1/ǫ)
for all j > i ≥ 1. A˜ij is then post-processed by rounding
Aˆij = argminx=0,1 |A˜ij − x|.
Instead of processing each cell independently as in Naive
approach, our idea is to keep top-m noisy values A˜ij and
reconstruct them to 1-cells. However, the number of edges
m needs to be first obfuscated (note that in edge privacy
model, only n is public [14]). We can achieve this by Labo-
rious filtering, i.e. first computing the noisy number of edge
m˜ = m+Lap(1/ǫ2), then adding Laplace noise Lap(1/ǫ1) to
all n(n−1)2 cells and selecting top-m˜ noisy cells. This approach
costs O(n2) in space and O(n2 logn) in time because of
the materialization of all cells. TmF avoids such problem by
computing the threshold θ so that there are exactly m˜ noisy
cells larger than θ. We call those cells passing cells. Fig. 1
depicts the processes of Naive, Laborious filtering and TmF.
We have two cases: 0 < θ < 1 and 1 ≤ θ. The case θ ≤ 0
results in the number of passing cells is at least n(n−1)4 ≫ m˜,
so omitted.
Case 1: 0 < θ < 1: the number of passing 1-cells is
n1 = m
+∞∫
θ
ǫ1
2
exp(−ǫ1|x− 1|)dx = m
2
(2 − e−ǫ1(1−θ)) (2)
Fig. 1: TmF algorithm
The number of passing 0-cells is
n0 = (
n(n− 1)
2
−m)
+∞∫
θ
ǫ1
2
exp(−ǫ1|x|)dx
= (
n(n− 1)
2
−m)1
2
e−ǫ1θ
By equating the sum of n1 and n0 to m˜, we can compute the
value of θ. Because m˜ = m+Lap(1/ǫ2), we have E[m˜] = m.
So to simplify the calculations, we set n1+n0 = m. This leads
to
θ =
1
2ǫ1
ln(
n(n− 1)
2m
− 1) + 1
2
(3)
Case 2: 1 ≤ θ: Similarly, the value of θ is
θ =
1
ǫ1
ln(
n(n− 1)
4m
+
1
2
(eǫ1 − 1)) (4)
In Algorithm 1, we replace all m by m˜.
B. Algorithm
To decide whether θ ≥ 1 or 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, we compute the
threshold ǫt of ǫ1 at θ = 1. For both cases,
θ = 1↔ ǫt = ln(n(n− 1)
2m
− 1) (5)
Theorem 3.1: The complexity of TmF is O(m) 
Proof: Processing 1-cells (Lines 10-15) runs in O(m).
The maximum value of n0 (Line 17) is m˜ ( = m in expecta-
tion). For each 0-cell to be processed, the rejection sampling
(Line 19) succeeds with probability at least 1 − 2mn(n−1) =
1 − O(1/n). So in summary, the total complexity of TmF is
O(m).
Theorem 3.1 makes sense if we consider the complexity
O(n2) of the state-of-the-art DER [3] and HRG-MCMC [14].
C. Privacy Analysis
In this section, we show that TmF satisfies ǫ-DP where
ǫ = ǫ1+ǫ2. Our TmF consists of two steps. It is easy to verify
that the sensitivity of m is 1. The first step of computing m˜
satisfies ǫ2-DP. The second step of processing 1-cells and 0-
cells is equivalent to independently adding noise Lap(1/ǫ1)
to each cell and letting them go through a high-pass filter
with threshold θ. The sensitivity of each cell is also 1. By
the assumption of edge independence, parallel composition
(Theorem 2.2) is applicable at cell level. So the second step
satisfies ǫ1-DP. By sequential composition (Theorem 2.2),
TmF satisfies (ǫ1+ ǫ2)-DP as stated in the following theorem.
Algorithm 1 Top-m Filter
Input: input graph G = (V,E), privacy parameters ǫ1, ǫ2
Output: sanitized graph G˜
1: G˜← ∅
2: // compute m˜ and θ
3: m˜ = m+ Lap(1/ǫ2)
4: ǫt = ln(n(n−1)2m˜ − 1)
5: if ǫ1 < ǫt then
6: θ = 1
2ǫ1
ln(n(n−1)
2m˜
− 1)
7: else
8: θ = 1
ǫ1
ln(n(n−1)
4m˜
+ 1
2
(eǫ1 − 1))
9: // process 1-cells
10: n1 = 0
11: for Aij = 1 do
12: compute A˜ij = Aij + Lap(1/ǫ1)
13: if A˜ij > θ then
14: add edge (i, j) to G˜
15: n1 ++
16: // process 0-cells
17: n0 = m˜− n1
18: while n0 > 0 do
19: random pick an edge (i, j)
20: if G˜ does not contain (i, j) then
21: add edge (i, j) to G˜
22: n0- -
23: return G˜
Theorem 3.2: TmF satisfies ǫ-DP where ǫ = ǫ1 + ǫ2. 
Now we proceed to the more important result: TmF could
reduce the edit distance between G˜ and G to O(1) at ǫ1 =
O(log n). The edit distance is defined as
D(G, G˜) =
1
2
(|EG \ EG˜|+ |EG˜ \ EG|) (6)
By the analysis in section III-A, the expected number of
passing 1-cells is n1, so the expected edit distance D(G, G˜) =
m − n1. At θ = 1, we have n1 = m2 = D(G, G˜)
and ǫ1 = ǫt = ln(n(n−1)2m˜ − 1). The cases of small edit
distance therefore correspond to the case 0 < θ < 1. Setting
D(G, G˜) = γm , γ ∈ [ 1m , 1], we need to find the value of ǫ1.
D(G, G˜) = γm
↔ m− m
2
(2− e−ǫ1(1−θ)) = γm
↔ e−ǫ1(1−θ) = 2γ
↔ θ = 1 + 1
ǫ1
ln(2γ)
↔ 1
2ǫ1
ln(
n(n− 1)
2m
− 1) + 1
2
= 1 +
1
ǫ1
ln(2γ) (from (3))
↔ ǫ1 = ln(
n(n−1)
2m − 1
4γ2
)
Because real-world graphs are usually sparse, m = O(n),
we reach ǫ1 = O(log n). Specifically, ǫ1 ≈ 3 lnn, ǫ1 ≈ 2 lnn,
ǫ1 ≈ lnn at γ = 1m , γ = 1√m and γ = 0.5O(√d¯) respectively
(d¯ = 2mn is the average degree). We come up with the
following theorem.
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Fig. 2: n1/m as a function of ǫ1/(3 lnn)
Theorem 3.3: TmF can make the edit distance D(G, G˜) =
O(1) at ǫ1 ≈ 3 lnn. 
Fig. 2 shows the normalized number of passing 1-cells
n1/m as a function of ǫ1/(3 lnn) over eight datasets (cf. Table
I). As we can see, at ǫ1 = lnn, 65-90% of the edges in G are
kept in G˜.
This result naturally points out the waste of privacy budget
in [11], [12] and [13] where ǫ = O(√n) or ǫ = O(n).
Interestingly, in HRG-MCMC scheme [14], the sensitivity
∆u ≈ 2 lnn which means the scheme corresponds to our case
γ = 1√
m
if we set ǫ1 = ∆u.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, our evaluation aims to show the efficiency
(in runtime) of TmF and compare its effectiveness (in terms of
utility metrics) with HRG-MCMC and DER. We pick six small
and medium-sized graphs and two large ones 1. In Table I,
logLK1 and logLK2 are the log-likelihoods of the dendrograms
[14] created by Louvain algorithm [2] and bottom-up binary
construction (i.e. nodes 1 and 2 are paired, nodes 3 and 4 are
paired and so on) respectively.
A. Utility Metrics
We use the following statistics for utility measurement
- Average degree: SAD = 1n
∑
v∈V dv
- Maximal degree: SMD = maxv∈V dv
- Degree variance: SDV = 1n
∑
v∈V (dv − SAD)2
- Power-law exponent of degree sequence: SPL is the
estimate of γ assuming the degree sequence follows a power-
law ∆(d) ∼ d−γ
- Average distance: SAPD is the average distance among
all pairs of vertices that are path-connected.
- Effective diameter: SEDiam is the 90-th percentile distance
among all path-connected pairs of vertices.
- Connectivity length: SCL is defined as the harmonic mean
of all pairwise distances in the graph.
- Diameter : SDiam is the maximum distance among all
path-connected pairs of vertices.
- Clustering coefficient: SCC = 3N∆N3 where N∆ is the
number of triangles and N3 is the number of connected triples.
1available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/˜mejn/netdata/ and
http://snap.stanford.edu/data/index.html
- Degree distribution: SDD is the normalized degree his-
togram.
- Distance distribution: SPDD is the normalized node-pair
shortest-path histogram.
All of the above statistics are taken average over 10
sample graphs. SAPD, SCL, SEDiam, SDiam are computed
exactly in six small graphs. In amazon and youtube, SDiam is
lower bounded by the longest distance among all-destination
breadth-first-searches from 1,000 randomly chosen nodes.
The relative error (rel.err) for each metric S is computed
as
|S(G)−Savg(G˜)|
S(G) except SDD and SPDD whose errors are
computed as |S(G)− Savg(G˜)|1/2.
TABLE I: Graph dataset statistics (k:thousand, m:million)
Dataset #Nodes #Edges logLK1 logLK2
polbooks 105 441 -950 -1248
polblogs 1,124 16,715 -66k -74k
as20graph 6,474 12,572 -71k -100k
wiki-Vote 7,115 100,762 -576k -618k
ca-HepPh 12,006 118,489 -383k -876k
ca-AstroPh 18,771 198,050 -904k -1.54m
amazon 334k 925k -2.99m -2.88m
youtube 1,134k 2,987k -18.02m -11.14m
B. Effectiveness of TmF
We assess the utility of TmF by varying ǫ1 (Fig. 3) while
fixing ǫ2 = 1.0. As ǫ1 increases (lower privacy guarantee),
we gain better utility (lower relative errors). For six small
graphs, TmF utility scores are nearly linear in ǫ1 for ǫ1 in the
range [0, lnn]. As ǫ1 exceeds the threshold ǫt (Fig. 2), the edit
distance D(G, G˜) decreases quickly, so does the relative error.
C. Comparative Evaluation
We report comparisons between TmF and HRG-MCMC,
DER in Fig. 3. For HRG-MCMC, we vary ǫ1 between 2∆u
and 1.0 (used in [14]). Clearly, HRG-MCMC and DER also
provide better utility at higher Σǫ. However, the relative error
does not change much within a wide range of ǫ. We could
explain this phenomenon by the usage of reconstruction in
HRG-MCMC and DER. Reconstruction steps make the edit
distance D(G, G˜) be O(m). In contrast, TmF, by relating ǫ1
to the edit distance, makes the relationship between ǫ1 and
relative error much more correlated. Roughly speaking, HRG-
MCMC performs best in stringent regime (ǫ1 = 2.0) whereas
TmF outperforms the others at high privacy budgets (ǫ1 =
8.0, 16.0).
On the runtime, TmF produces a sample graph in less then
10s for youtube graph, whereas HRG-MCMC takes one day
and DER takes 250s for ca-AstroPh graph.
V. CONCLUSION
We provide an upper bound for privacy budget ǫ that any dif-
ferentially private scheme for graph release should not exceed.
Based on filtering technique, we design the algorithm TmF
that reduces the edit distance between the noisy graph and
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Fig. 3: Comparison of utility in terms of relative error (Y-axis)
vs. ǫ (X-axis)
the true graph to O(1). Our scheme TmF can run on million-
scale graphs. The comprehensive experiments demonstrate the
efficiency and effectiveness of our scheme and explain the
loss of information in the state-of-the-art HRG-MCMC and
DER. For future work, we intend to (1) include the degree
sequence (1K-series [8]) into the scheme to improve the utility,
(2) investigate other summary structures for graphs other than
HRG.
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